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Abstract:  
 
In this paper we use Israel/Palestine as a case study to examine the politics of human 
shielding, while focusing on the epistemic and political operations through which the 
deployment of the legal category of human shield legitimizes the use of lethal force. 
After offering a concise genealogy of human shields in international law, we examine 
the way Israel used the concept in the 2014 Gaza war by examining a series of 
infographics spread by the IDF on social media. Exposing the connection between the 
re-signification of space and the constitution of a civilian as a shield, we maintain that 
the infographics are part of a broader apparatus of discrimination deployed by Israel 
to frame its violence post hoc in order to claim that this violence was utilized in 
accordance with international law.  We conclude by arguing that the relatively recent 
appearance of human shields highlights the manifestation of a contemporary political 
antinomy: human shields have to continue to be considered protected civilians, but 
they are considered an integral part of the hostilities, which transforms them into 
killable subjects. 
 
 
 
Key words: Human Shields, Civilian, Urban Warfare, Social Media, Principle of 
Distinction, International Humanitarian Law, Israel, Palestine.  
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The Politics of Human Shielding: On the Resignification of Space and the 
Constitutions of Civilians as Shields in Liberal Wars1  
 
 
 
The meaning of the distinction between legitimate 
violence and illegitimate violence is not 
immediately obvious. 
            Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence 
 
 
 
A shield literally denotes an object of variable dimension and shape, which is used as 
an instrument of protection. As a basic military concept, the word shield refers to a 
universal and cross-cultural instrument utilized in different contexts in order to 
provide defense and preserve the human body from being injured. On the one hand, 
then, a shield is a protective tool, one that reminds us that human beings, even the 
most capable and brave, always remain vulnerable subjects who can be injured or 
killed. On the other hand, since almost every offensive is dependent on some sort of 
protection, the shield also functions as a necessary instrument of combat, making it 
easier for its possessor to injure or kill the enemy. The shield, in other words, serves 
as a physical and conceptual threshold. It epitomizes the dialectic between armed 
offense and defense within the framework of violence and war.  
The issue becomes even more complex—evoking the Benjaminian (1978) 
question about the meaning of violence—when the adjective human is tied to the 
word shield, forming the phrase human shield. Generally speaking, this phrase refers 
to those situations in which civilian bodies acquire a protective function in the midst 
of fighting; willingly or unwillingly these bodies are transformed into a technology of 
warfare—in the Foucauldian (1988) sense whereby technology can be a form of 
human action—and, like inanimate shields, they embody a dialectic between offense 
                                                          
1 The authors appear in alphabetical order and acknowledge equal contribution. 
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and defense. But in spite of the similarities between inanimate and animate shields, 
three crucial distinctions need to be stressed in order to understand the specificity of 
human shielding.  
 First, unlike the inanimate shield, the human shield is predicated upon a value 
that is ascribed to a living human being who is defined as a civilian and as such 
protected according to international humanitarian law (IHL). Put differently, the 
materiality of the human body does not really lend itself to shielding and therefore if 
the human was conceived to be a mere inanimate object lacking the value assigned to 
the human qua civilian it would not be useful as a shield; a human body thus becomes 
a shield by virtue of its definition as a civilian. The central category of civilian in IHL 
(Kinsella 2011) is, in other words, the condition of possibility of human shielding.  
Second, as opposed to the inanimate shield, which is ultimately conceived and 
produced in order to protect human vulnerability in war, in the case of human shields 
vulnerability itself becomes the means of protection. In other words, the human shield 
defends a vulnerable body (an animated combatant), an object (an unanimated 
weapon or military structure), or an area (in some cases a civilian area) that has 
become part of the military hostilities, but it does so through its own vulnerability. In 
this sense, the politics of human shielding is fundamentally a politics of vulnerability: 
a form of politics in which vulnerability occupies a central position in the definition of 
the relationship between political actors within the battlefield and the meaning of 
violence.  
The third distinction results from the first two and concerns the ethics of 
shielding. Unlike inanimate shields, the appearance of both voluntary and involuntary 
human shields in a war zone produces a certain ethical uncertainty or ambiguity in the 
laws of war (Bargu 2013). When a person in a battlefield is defined as a human 
4 
 
shield—a vulnerable civilian body that willingly or not becomes a technology of 
warfare whose function is to render a military target immune—he or she loses some 
of the protections assigned to civilians by IHL and an ethical quandary surfaces 
relating to the precise legal status of the human shield. Questions concerning the 
circumstances allowing human shields to be legitimately killed, the way the spaces 
they occupy are signified, as well as who is responsible for the life and potential death 
of the human shield, constitute the basic grammar of the ethics of human shielding.  
In the following pages we focus on this latter articulation of human shielding, 
while reflecting on the emergence of the phrase human shields in its contemporary 
normative and political meaning (Schmitt 2008; Otto 2004; Rubinstein and Roznai 
2011). What exactly are human shields? When did the notion of human shielding 
begin to crystallize in the international political arena? And what is the ethical 
function of human shields, particularly in relation to the deployment and 
legitimization of political violence? In order to better understand the politics of human 
shielding—by which we mean the epistemic and political operations through which 
the deployment of the legal category of human shield legitimizes the use of lethal 
force, potentially against entire civilian populations and the spaces they inhabit—we 
examine the 2014 Israeli military operation in Gaza, dubbed by Israel as "Protective 
Edge."  
One of the prominent claims repeated by the Israeli government and military 
throughout the offensive is that Hamas (the Palestinian Islamist party that rules the 
Gaza Strip) deliberately used human shields as a warfare technique, and therefore it 
bears responsibility for the extensive killing of civilians and destruction of civilian 
buildings and infrastructures carried out by the Israeli army during the military 
campaign. In his first appearance at the UN General Assembly after Protective Edge, 
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Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeated the human shields mantra. Showing his 
international audience a picture of children playing in the vicinity of a rocket 
launcher, he averred that “Hamas deliberately placed its rockets where Palestinian 
children live and play” (Frederick, 2014).  
The constant reiteration of the human shields trope in reference to Gaza 
demands further inquiry. And although this military campaign presented its own 
specificities, the way the concept human shield was deployed throughout the fray 
helps reveal why the accusation of human shielding applies only to certain political 
actors; why only certain subjects can become human shields while others are 
excluded; and what is the foundational logic and political implications of these 
distinctions.  
We begin to address these questions with a concise genealogy of human 
shields in international law, followed by a brief overview of how the discourse of 
human shields emerged in the context of Israel/Palestine. Next, we examine the way 
Israel used the concept human shield in the 2014 Gaza war by analyzing a series of 
infographics spread by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on its Twitter account, 
Facebook and official blog. It is in this context that we discuss the intricately knit 
connection between the resignification of space and the constitution of a civilian as a 
shield, showing also that the infographics are merely one element in a broader 
apparatus of discrimination produced by the IDF. After illustrating how the 
deployment of the phrase human shield helps render legal the deployment of lethal 
violence against civilians, we conclude by arguing that the relatively recent 
appearance of human shields highlights the manifestation of a contemporary political 
antinomy. 
 
6 
 
A Brief Genealogy of Human Shields  
Every critique of violence is primarily a historical and philosophical investigation into 
the legal and political genealogy of the concepts that provide violence its own 
rationalization (Benjamin 1978). In IHL, the term civilian is one of the key concepts 
that determines the legitimacy and illegitimacy of violence (Pilloud and others 1987; 
Meron 1989; Kinsella 2011). The principle of distinction between combatant and 
noncombatant formally serves to protect civilian lives (Hannikainen 1988). Different 
humanitarian conventions stipulate how civilians should be protected in time of war 
(Sassòli, Bouvier, and Quintin 2011). And yet, as Antony Anghie (2007) and other 
scholars (Ringmar 2013; Wilke 2014) remind us, civilianhood was historically 
couched along racial lines until its progressive universalization following World War 
II.  
During colonialism, the status of civilian was recognized only to the citizens 
of colonial powers. IHL did not protect either indigenous combatants or 
noncombatants. Therefore, when colonial states killed the colonized they did it 
without violating international law, since colonial subjects were considered outside its 
sphere of application (Anghie 2007). But after the process of decolonization the 
category of combatant and civilian was extended to the ex-colonized, who were then 
conceived as protected subjects under international law.  
The universalization of civilianhood within the post-colonial context has 
produced new ethical dilemmas for international law regulating warfare. A new 
tension emerged between, on the one hand, the desire of liberal states to frame their 
wars and violence within international law (Khalili 2012) and, on the other hand, the 
wide scale killing of civilians in contemporary wars (Eck and Hultman 2007). This, as 
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we maintain, is exactly why the concept human shield is becoming increasingly 
important and why its critique is urgent.  
Human shielding refers to the use of persons protected by IHL, such as 
prisoners of war or civilians, to deter attacks on combatants or military sites. At first 
glance, the phrase human shield does not seem to rationalize violence, but rather to 
prohibit an unethical form of warfare and render it illegitimate. Placing civilians on 
train tracks, in airports or in any site that is considered to be a legitimate military 
target of the enemy army in order to prevent the latter from striking is illegal 
according to IHL. Along similar lines, carrying out military operations from within 
civilian spaces, particularly schools, hospitals, religious sites, civilian neighborhoods 
and even industrial areas is illegal due to the potential use of human shields.  
While human shields have been used throughout history in order to protect 
both military and non-military targets,2 it took the greater part of the 20th century for 
the legal category of human shielding to crystallize into its contemporary normative 
meaning. One cannot find explicit reference to human shields in the Hague 
Conventions, but Article 23 of the 1907 Convention states that “A belligerent is 
forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of 
war directed against their own country.”3 Referring to this article, an official 
commission of the Belgian government blamed the German forces of using “human 
                                                          
2  Contemporary dictionaries almost immediately bestow a military meaning upon the 
notion of human shield. However, other forms of shielding exist. In different periods 
human bodies were used as shields also in order to protect different kinds of 
environmental or natural resources, or to defend goods and properties from 
dispossession. 
3 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 23. The 
Hague, 18 October 1907. 
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screens” during World War I.4 The authors of the 1915 report explain that “If it be not 
permissible to compel a man to fire on his fellow citizens, neither can he be forced to 
protect the enemy and to serve as a living screen.” This is how the Belgian 
governmental commission reconstructed some of the German practices of “human 
screening”: 
In both cases the effect would be to compel him to engage in acts 
of warfare against his own countrymen, to expose him to danger, 
and to inflict upon him the most painful moral violence. But 
certain of the German officers have little regard for such 
considerations. On the 6th August a number of soldiers were 
made prisoners by a German column. At Saive a company of 
Belgians were encountered. The prisoners were immediately 
placed at the head of the troops, so to cover the column and make 
it impossible for the Belgians to fire upon them. On the 23rd 
August the Germans forced women and children to walk in front 
of the troops ordered to take the bridge at Lives, opposite to 
Biez. A number of these women and children were wounded 
(Official Commission of the Belgian Government 1915 p. xviii).  
Germany’s occupation of Belgium provoked an intense debate that included 
European government officials, US representatives, and different intellectuals. In the 
eyes of many participating in this debate, German warfare in Belgium constituted a 
moral watershed. Abuses against Belgian civilians and particularly the violation of the 
principle of distinction between combatants and noncombatants occupied, for 
                                                          
4 On the emergence of the accusation of human shielding in WWI see also Isabel Hull 
2014, particularly chapter three.  
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example, a central place in Emile Durkheim’s condemnation of “German mentality.” 
In spite of the fact that Germany had previously used many of its WWI warfare 
techniques in its colonies (including the use of civilians to prevent attacks against its 
troops), according to Durkheim, WWI and particularly the crimes Germany committed 
on European soil represented a turning point that marked Germany’s exclusion from 
“the great family of civilized people” (Durkheim 1915 p. 3).5  
While Belgian case may have been one of the first instances whereby an 
enemy army was explicitly accused of using human shields by an official 
commission, during and after World War II human shielding was referred to more 
frequently. Nazi military commanders frequently transported prisoners in trains 
carrying ammunition and soldiers in an attempt to shield the trains and tracks from 
aerial attacks. But this did not stop the Allies, who bombed the trains while knowing 
that innocent prisoners, transformed by the Germans into human shields, were being 
killed (Blatman 2011). It is therefore not particularly surprising that in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention the pertinent article was altered so as to permit military forces to 
attack targets that are protected by human shields, thus combining the prohibition of 
using human shields with the legalization of killing them (provided the killing abides 
by the principle of proportionality). While the term human shield does not actually 
appear in the document, the Fourth Geneva Convention provides de jure protection to 
militaries that kill human shields.6  
                                                          
5 Durkheim (1915, pp. 3-4) ascribed Germany’s “contempt of international law” and 
“savagery” to some “essential elements” of the German “mental and moral system.” 
6 "The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or 
areas immune from military operations." Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, Article 28. 
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The word shield first appears in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 
Convention, only after decolonization. Article 51(7) both prohibits the use of human 
shields and reiterates that it is legitimate for militaries to attack areas protected by 
human shields. “The presence or movement of the civilian population or individual 
civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military 
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to 
shield, favor or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct 
the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to 
shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.”7 More 
recently, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court characterized 
human shielding as a war crime.8  
The introduction of human shields in IHL was, as Banu Bargu (2013) has 
noted, a reaction to the increasing “weaponization” of human bodies in contemporary 
warfare. Bargu concentrates on voluntary human shields, arguing that they should be 
conceived as a new form of agency that aims to protect the weak by achieving 
deterrence during warfare through the invocation of a certain moral sensibility. We 
follow this line of argument, but shift the perspective in two important ways. First, we 
are interested in all forms of human shielding, both voluntary and involuntary, 
particularly since the latter comprise the vast majority of human shields. Accordingly, 
agency is not a prominent category in our analysis. Second, we examine the 
phenomenon by analyzing how the powerful operate, maintaining that the use of the 
                                                          
7 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, Art. 51(7), 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
8 Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998). Art. 8(2) (b)xiii. 
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legal phrase human shields should be understood not so much as a protective 
technology of the weak, but rather as a necro-technology deployed by the strong—a 
technology that recasts civilians as legitimate targets of lethal violence.  
Indeed, the significance of human shield clauses in international law cannot be 
overstated considering that urban settings are rapidly becoming exceptionally 
prominent battlefields (Gregory 2011). Urban areas, as Stephen Graham put it, "have 
become the lightning conductors for our planet's political violence," while "warfare 
strongly shapes quotidian urban life" (Graham 2011 p. 16.). The dramatic increase in 
urban warfare entails that civilians inevitably occupy the front lines of the fighting. 
Insofar as this is the case, then practically all fighting within cities involves warfare 
practices that, according to IHL, can be said to include the use of human shields. It 
also suggests that human shielding has a very pronounced spatial and architectural 
dimension. 
 
The Development of the Human Shields Discourse in Israel/Palestine  
Civilians have often been at the forefront of violence in Israel/Palestine. One of the 
first instances of the use of human shields occurred during the 1936-39 Arab revolt in 
mandatory Palestine, when Palestinians carried out frequent acts of anti-colonial 
sabotage against British installations, including railway lines and trains. Initially, the 
lines were patrolled on foot and by reinforcing the train cabs with armor and 
mounting them with soldiers and machineguns. This did not seem to work, since the 
"trolleys were derailed and fired at on numerous occasions."  The British accordingly 
equipped the train with a "pony truck," a contraption connected to the front of the 
train with a long extension whose function was to deflect the explosion of mines. As a 
report about the railways points out, "The pony trucks had a flat sheet built over the 
single axle on which, it was discovered, hostages could be made to sit" (Figure 1). 
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Hence, Palestinian bodies became a warfare technology, used as human shields 
against insurgency attacks and as "human mine sweepers" (Cotterell 1986; see also 
Anderson 2013 for the use of human shields during the 1936-9 Arab revolt).  
 
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
Caption: "Two Arabs are being taken for an uncomfortable ride on the pony truck 
extension." Source Haganah Museum.  
 
 
While human shields were used sporadically in Israel/Palestine over the next 
seven decades, it was only in the midst of the second Intifada that the legal category 
human shield was invoked with certain frequency. In a report entitled Human Shield, 
the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem describes how, during the 2002 
military operation “Defensive Shield,” Israeli soldiers would randomly take 
Palestinian civilians and force them to enter buildings suspected of being booby-
trapped, made them remove suspicious objects from roads, stand inside houses where 
soldiers had set up military positions, and walk in front of soldiers to shield them from 
gunfire (Stein 2002). This and other liberal human rights organizations (Sissons 2002) 
condemned Israel for violating the fundamental principle of civilian immunity 
inscribed in IHL. They noted that the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 1977 
Additional Protocol explicitly forbid the use of the civilian population to aid the 
military objectives of the occupying army as well as the forced use of local residents 
as a means towards military advantage or for the securing of intelligence.  
In an attempt to stop the weaponization of Palestinian human bodies, seven 
liberal Israeli human rights NGOs submitted a petition against the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of Defense and the Israeli military, asking the High Court of Justice to ban 
the use of human shields (Adalah 2014). In 2005, the Court reached a decision. Citing 
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Jean Pictet (1958), who wrote the official commentary on the Four Geneva 
Conventions, Chief Justice Aharon Barak characterized the use of people as human 
shields as a "cruel and barbaric" act. He noted that “a basic principle, which passes as 
a common thread running through all of the law of belligerent occupation, is the 
prohibition of use of protected residents as a part of the war effort of the occupying 
army.” IHL was, in other words, used by the court to protect Palestinian civilians 
against the demands of “military necessity.”  
One year after the High Court ruling, other Israeli political actors began 
appropriating the term human shield. The Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center (ITIC), a conservative Israeli think-tank whose offices are located in the 
Ministry of Defense, published a report about Hezbollah's use of Lebanese civilians as 
human shields during the 2006 Lebanon War (Erlich 2006).  In this report, the claims 
originally made by Israeli and international human rights organizations against the 
IDF, and which were validated by the High Court of Justice, were slightly reframed. 
Appropriating the same logic advanced by the liberal human rights NGOs, the anti-
terrorism think-tank accused Israel’s enemies of human shielding. In so doing, the 
think-tank transformed the prohibition of using human shields into a legal and ethical 
justification for military necessity (Perugini and Gordon 2015).  
The think-tank reasoned that Hezbollah’s violation served to legitimize 
Israel’s killing of Lebanese civilians, pointing out that the “exploitation” of a civilian 
population is “considered a war crime and gross violation of international laws 
governing armed conflict.” It went on to argue that “the IDF’s air strikes and ground 
attacks against Hezbollah targets located in population centers were carried out in 
accordance with international law, which does not grant immunity to a terrorist 
organization deliberately hiding behind civilians, using them as human shields” 
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(Erlich 2006 pp. 8, 10.). Hence, the use of human shields is not only a legal violation, 
but, in contemporary asymmetric urban wars, can also help validate the ethical claim 
that the death of “untargeted civilians” is merely collateral damage.  
A few years later, following the Israeli military campaign in Gaza called Cast 
Lead (winter 2008-2009), the same conservative think-tank published a report entitled 
Evidence of the Use of the Civilian Population as Human Shields (ITIC 2009a). In 
this and other reports released in subsequent months, the ITIC (2009b) provided a 
series of images and testimonies as evidence of how Hamas and other militant groups 
had used homes, schools and mosques for military-operational purposes. ITIC's 
descriptions help corroborate Eyal Weizman's (2006) claim that cities are not simply 
the site but the very medium of contemporary warfare as urban spheres increasingly 
become primary theatres of violence. Accordingly, within urban warfare the 
noncombatant and combatant as well as civilian and military edifices overlap. But 
since the non-combatant civilian is protected according to IHL this overlapping 
creates a problem for liberal regimes which insist on the legality of their actions in 
order to underscore the morality of the violence they deploy.  
 
Gaza 2014 and Human Shields 
According to data gathered by the UN, at least 2,133 Palestinians were killed during 
Israel’s 2014 military campaign “Protective Edge” in Gaza. Of the initially verified 
cases, 1,489 are believed to be civilians, including 500 children. Many fatalities 
involved multiple family members, with at least 142 Palestinian families having three 
or more relatives killed in the same incident, for a total of 739 deaths. In addition, 
approximately 18,000 housing units have been either destroyed or severely damaged, 
leaving approximately 108,000 people homeless. On the Israeli side, 72 people were 
killed during the war, 67 combatants and 5 civilians (OCHA oPt 2014). These 
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figures already point to a clear discrepancy with respect to the number and proportion 
of civilian deaths: 70 percent of all those killed by Israel were civilians compared to 
the 7.5 percent of civilians killed by Palestinians.  
The legal phrase “human shield” became one of the central tropes 
promulgated by Israel during the Gaza war because, on the one hand, the 
categorization of civilians as human shields helps conceal the fact that "pin point 
strikes" and "surgical capabilities" can neither predict nor guarantee discrimination, 
while on the other hand, it helps Israel justify the large proportion of civilian deaths 
and the destruction of civilian spaces in Gaza. The normative argument became part 
of “semiotic warfare” aimed at legitimizing Israel's military campaign.9 Hence, in 
order to understand how the phrase operated during Israel’s war on Gaza it is vital to 
develop a critique of human shielding that is concomitantly a critique of both military 
and semiotic violence. 
In War and Cinema, Paul Virilio (1989) reconstructs the history of an 
alignment between the way the battlefield is being structured and the structuring of 
the field of perception. The killing, he claims, is inseparable from the production of 
images. Judith Butler (2009) makes a similar claim in Frames of War, where she 
defines “framing” as an array of power operations—some of which are visual—
marshaled to legitimize violence against vulnerable subjects and groups. Building on 
their analysis, we maintain that social media is increasingly playing a determinant 
role in shaping not only the visual perception of the battlefield, but even more 
importantly the legal and moral gaze on the battlefield. The way in which the 
                                                          
9  By semiotic warfare we mean, following Edward Said (1980 p. xix.), the array of 
discoursive operations deployed in order to delegitimize an enemy and give meaning 
to the use of violence against it.  
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perception of the battlefield is framed helps determine whether the violence deployed 
by the different actors is legitimate or illegitimate.  
An analysis of the infographics disseminated by the Israeli military through 
social media provides an unparalleled illustration of how Israel strived to provide 
legal and moral justification for killing hundreds of civilians. One of the first 
infographics circulated by the military sets the stage for the Gaza war by portraying 
Israel’s assault as an attempt to defend the very essence of the liberal ideal. Using one 
of liberal democracy’s iconic symbols, it shows rockets with bloody smoke heading 
towards the Statue of Liberty and asks the Western public: “What would you do?” In 
this way, Israel both positions itself as a liberal democracy and draws an analogy 
between the Gaza war and post 9/11 preoccupations of terrorist attacks against the 
United States.    
Crucially for our analysis, the overwhelming majority of the infographics 
produced during Protective Edge were dedicated to human shields.  One of the themes 
that appears in most the infographics and serves as the condition of possibility for 
Israel's claims about the use of human shields is the depiction of the asymmetric 
context in which the Gaza war took place as if it were symmetric. This symmetric 
representation is carried out in “Some bomb shelters shelter people, some shelter 
bombs” (Figure 2) as well as in numerous other infographics, where the radically 
disproportionate power differential and spatial disparity between a besieged 
population confined to an enclave and its besiegers is depicted as if the two camps 
were equal and enjoyed the same military and spatial capabilities. The assumption of 
equality not only elides the reality on the ground, but is necessary for Israel to 
justify—through the human shielding argument—its destruction of Gaza within a 
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liberal imagination. In Figure 2 liberal Israel shields humans, whereas illiberal Hamas 
shields bombs.  
            
Figure 2 about here 
 
A paradigmatic example of how Israel actually built its human shielding 
argument can be seen in “When is a House a Home?” (Figure 4), which shows how 
Palestinians presumably hide rockets in civilian homes. The logic is straightforward: 
insofar as Hamas hides weapons in homes (illegitimate), Israel can bomb them as if 
they were (legitimate) military targets. Within this semiotic warfare about the 
meaning of architectural structures, a single function (hiding weapons) overrides 
existing functions (home, shelter, intimacy, etc.) so that the edifice's form loses its 
normative social signification, including its attribute as a space of protection. A house 
is no longer a refuge; even when the majority of the people in the targeted area are, in 
fact, refugees, like in Gaza's case. The transformation of the space's signification is 
crucial, since it also transforms the meaning ascribed to the human and to the violence 
that is deployed. Put differently, Israel’s “moral cartography,” to borrow Derek 
Gregory’s (2006a) definition of how the conception of morally acceptable violence is 
related to space, is acutely apparent here since the way a place is defined determines 
which civilians can be killed without it being a legal and moral crime. 
It is precisely the inevitable overlapping of civilian and military functions in 
urban warfare that creates new challenges for international law and the articulation of 
ethical violence for liberal regimes. The re-signification of urban architectural 
structures as well as of humans is the way this challenge is addressed. Accordingly, 
the question posed in Figure 3 “when does it become a legitimate military target?” 
should be understood as merely rhetorical.  The answer the IDF expects is: “all houses 
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in Gaza can be legitimate targets since, all houses are potentially non-homes." In this 
way the IDF resolves the ethical dilemma of bombing civilian sites. In “Why did this 
turn into this?” (Figure 4) the military's graphic designer owns up to the consequences 
of Israel’s attacks and shows how civilian homes have been transformed into rubble, 
but explains that this is what happens when “Hamas uses civilian homes for military 
purposes.” 
Figure 3 and 4 about here 
  
 
Giorgio Agamben’s analysis of sovereignty helps make sense of the IDF's 
discursive operation. In Homo Sacer (1998, 121-122; 183-184), Agamben defines 
sovereign power as the power to determine and administer the threshold between 
private and public life (see also Agamben 2014). Echoing Agamben’s discussion of 
this threshold, Lisa Bhungalia has already shown that since Israel's withdrawal from 
the Gaza Strip in 2005, it has used the notion of "hostile entity" to "effectively 
collapse the space between the civilian body and the battlefield" (Bhungalia 2012, p. 
353), while implementing a complex governing system—through the sanctions 
regime—that fuses Foucault’s biopolitics and Mbembe’s necropolitics (Ibid., 355).  
We maintain that the infographics articulate a similar politico-military logic but are 
informed by an additional and crucial layer of control. Israel's introduction of 
infographics is part of what we call the "apparatus of distinction," which, following 
Foucault's notion of dispositif (1980), we understand as a force that shapes, frames 
and thus gives meaning to the relationship among the actors within the battlefield.   
A series of military video clips released during and after the Protective Edge 
reveal that this apparatus is made up of an array of experts from different branches of 
the military and security services who deploy various systems of knowledge while 
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utilizing numerous forms of imaging and surveillance in order to map and frame the 
battlefield, while they develop different algorithms and calculations to guarantee 
“accurate targeting.”10 The clips expose how a variety of institutions and actors—such 
as government and security agencies, think tanks, NGOs, and media outlets that 
employ legal and security experts, lobbyists, film directors, editors and producers, 
graphic designers, animation artists and copywriters—put to use heterogeneous 
technologies, such as satellite images, lasers, GPS, GIS, aerial photos and videos, and 
acoustic vector systems. This apparatus of discrimination maps and frames the 
battlefield and is put to use in order to achieve a dual purpose: it is used to direct the 
deployment of violence during the fighting and to interpret the meaning of violence 
post-hoc. The post-hoc framing is crucial to this process since it allows Israel to claim 
that violence was utilized in accordance with international law and is, as a 
consequence, ethical. The infographics help to underscore the intimate relationship 
between lethal force and the force of discrimination, between the force of military 
violence and the forces that frame that violence in order to legitimize it.  
While we cannot discuss the structure and different manifestations of this 
apparatus here, Figure 5, for example, shows how the Israeli military reframed the 
function of a house and the forms of life taking place within it by claiming that the 
armed resistance in Gaza transformed homes into military facilities. This exceptional 
situation sanctions the deployment of lethal violence—in conformity with 
international law—against those civilians who occupy the space where normally 
private life takes place. In this way, the notion of human shielding erases existing 
                                                          
10 A paradigmatic example is a clip entitled "Targeting the Enemy: The IDF's Anti-Terror 
Strategy in Gaza" accessed online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j16xIxZdqgg  
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distinctions between private and public spaces, including, as it were, homes within the 
bounds of legitimate targets by excluding their normative functions (Agamben 1998).  
Israel’s warfare is, however, not only about the re-signification of architectural 
structures. It is also about the transformation of human beings into collateral damage, 
subjects who can be killed in their homes without violating international law. The 
legitimization for its bombing is premised upon a profound moral disjuncture between 
Israelis and Palestinians, which is uncannily similar to the way the colonizers of old 
related to the natives.  
In “For Hamas nothing is sacred” (Figure 5) the military's graphic designer 
drew the contours of a mosque between two rocket launchers and above a tunnel 
system that leads into the mosque. The title suggests that Hamas is different from the 
rest of humanity because it does not recognize the distinction between sacred and 
profane, and ignores the elementary grammar of the laws of war.  
Figure 5 and 6 about here 
 
This is expressed even more blatantly in “Hamas uses its Civilians to Harm 
Ours,” where a Palestinian home is portrayed as the warhead of a Hamas rocket 
(Figure 6). The subtext, of course, is that the people living in this home (children, 
women, and the elderly) are the human weapon Hamas uses against Israel. In the 
context of our discussion, these infographics also intimate that Hamas does not adopt 
any apparatus of distinction, does not understand the ethical and normative difference 
between civilian and combatant, and transforms the whole population into 
combatants, rendering them killable. This framing travelled from social to mainstream 
media, and is apparent, for example, not only in the way human shields were 
characterized in different conservative outlets such as Fox News, but also in the way 
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they were presented in cartoons that appeared in scores of newspapers around the 
world.11  
The ultimate function of all these images is to insinuate a moral 
incommensurability between oppressors and oppressed. It both reflects and produces 
an ethics whereby the space of killing with impunity is dramatically expanded through 
the obliteration of the threshold between spaces of life and spaces of death.  
International law draws a connection between geographical spaces and forms of legal 
violence; a form of violence that is legally permitted in the battlefield is prohibited in 
the city or home (Orford 2003). It is clear that often these distinctions collapse in 
contemporary urban warfare, but the question that interests us involves the ethical 
justification that is provided when the distinctions are undermined.  
Derek Gregory maintains that in order to overcome the ethical problem of 
using lethal violence in places populated by civilians Israel and the US often describe 
the bombed space as if it were disembodied, as if it were empty of all subjects 
(Gregory 2006b). But when civilians end up dying such a depiction does not really 
tackle the ethical problem we are addressing, since the space is revealed to be 
embodied, and those who bombed it can be accused of violating international law. We 
accordingly maintain that because the way space is defined helps determine the legal 
and moral status of the human inhabiting it, Israel's major strategy in its infographic 
campaign was to frame its war on Gaza in a way that alters the signification of certain 
spaces. The legality of killing civilians was thus produced by defining them as human 
shields operating within a warzone. Hence, Palestinian space is not depicted as empty 
but rather as a battleground and this alters the legal status of the people inhabiting it. 
                                                          
11 A basic google image search of "human shields" and "cartoons" provides scores of 
examples. 
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Indeed, for Palestinians living in Gaza, simply spending time in their own homes, 
frequenting a mosque, going to a hospital or to school became a potentially lethal 
activity, since any one of these architectural edifices could become a target at any 
moment.  
One of the effects of the politics of human shielding is that one can no longer 
safely assume that the existence of masses of human bodies in civilian spaces can 
serve as defense against the lethal capacity of liberal hi-tech states. In other words, 
this politics seems to consist of a twofold process in which the redefinition of space 
enables the redefinition of the civilian and his or her transformation into a shield.  
 
A Humanitarian Shield 
Obviously, the infographics were not the only images circulating in the public sphere 
during the Gaza war. Many images, both in social and in the mainstream media, 
showed the massive destruction in Gaza carried out by the Israeli military. Therefore, 
one should understand the infographics as part of a counter-narrative disseminated by 
Israel in order to respond to the allegations of egregious violations and war crimes. It 
appears that the infographic campaign had three objectives. First, it was aimed at 
Israel's supporters in order to guide them how to respond to the harsh accusations 
regarding the number of civilian deaths and the degree of destruction in Gaza. 
Second, it provided a line of argumentation for certain, mostly conservative, media 
outlets. Finally, it offered a legal defense. Considering that the fighting in Gaza has 
been subjected to international legal oversight, we understand the infographics as part 
of a lawmaking process resulting from the interaction and convergence of different 
political actors involved in the allocation of the right to live and to die in 
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contemporary wars. It is this last objective that we want to briefly examine before 
turning to the conclusion.   
A tension exists between the prohibition of killing human shields and the 
principle of proportionality. This tension is part of a lawmaking process that emerged 
with particular force after the so-called “War on Terror” and its penetration into urban 
spaces.  Scholars of different stripes agree that the principle of proportionality—
which requires belligerents to refrain from causing damage disproportionate to the 
military advantage to be gained—remains prevalent in cases of human shielding, but 
as Yoram Dinstein claims the “actual test of excessive injury to civilians must be 
relaxed. That is to say, the appraisal of whether civilian casualties are excessive in 
relation to the military advantage anticipated must make allowances for the fact that—
if an attempt is made to shield military objectives with civilians—civilian casualties 
will be higher than usual” (Dinstein 2004 p. 131. Italics added). The US Air Force 
adopts a similar position, maintaining that "lawful targets shielded with protected 
civilians may be attacked, and the protected civilians may be considered as collateral 
damage, provided that the collateral damage is not excessive compared to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated by the attack" (cited in Schmitt 2008 p. 51).  
That killing civilian human shields is permitted according to IHL, when 
certain conditions are fulfilled, is not only the view of the hi-tech militaries and their 
intellectuals of the court, but is basically the position adopted by humanitarian and 
human rights organizations. The International Committee of the Red Cross notes, in a 
manual entitled Fight it Right, that the “attacking commander is required to do his 
best to protect [civilian shields] but he is entitled to take the defending commander’s 
actions into account when considering the rule of proportionality” (Rogers and 
Malherbe 1999). The convergence between ICRC and the militaries of different 
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countries can be understood, using Gramsci's terms, as the manifestation of a 
historical bloc composed of ostensibly conflicting actors but which in actuality both 
reflects and re-produces the hegemony of liberal culture. They would all concur that 
Israel “fought the war right”: it used “precise hi-tech weapons” and took the 
“necessary precautions” when launching the assault. Thus, humanitarian law not only 
frames Israel's war as ethical, but also serves as a shield, protecting the pilots, drone 
operators and those who sent them on their missions from legal suits in courts that 
exercise universal jurisdiction.  
The mobilization of the human shield category as a humanitarian shield 
enables the legitimate use of lethal force. This is the position of the Israeli army, but 
also of several just war theorists, from Michael Walzer to Asa Kasher. For them the 
Palestinian civilians are indeed civilians, but even though Israel killed them, Israel is 
not the party responsible for their deaths (Kasher 2014; Walzer 2013). Hamas, we are 
told, shoulders a double responsibility—for attacking Israeli civilians and for killing 
Palestinian civilians—while the Israeli liberal regime bears no responsibility. 
Therefore it is not surprising that Israel, rather than the Palestinians, introduced the 
term human shielding in order to make sense of its violence in Gaza and used it 
incessantly. Israel constructed Palestinian civilians as human shields because if the 
hundreds of Palestinians that were killed during the war would have been considered 
simply civilians rather than human shields, then the drone and F-16 attacks would 
amount to a war crime according to international law. The legal and semiotic power to 
ascribe the status of human shields to civilians is the power to define the legitimacy 
and illegitimacy of the violence utilized against them.  
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the same logic informing the production 
of the infographics was also used by local and international NGOs as evidence of 
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Hamas’s deliberate strategy of human shielding. Two conservative organizations, 
NGO Monitor and UN Watch (2014), produced, for example, a joint report attacking 
the United Nations and prominent human rights NGOs for their presumed incapacity 
to investigate in a neutral manner the 2014 Gaza war. Written in collaboration with 
Colonial Richard Kemp—former commander of the British forces in Afghanistan—
the report argues that Hamas’s human shielding and Israel’s presumed deployment of 
its apparatus of discrimination legitimizes the extensive killing of Palestinian civilians 
that took place in Gaza. “If Israel is striking Hamas fighters, tunnels, or weaponry 
hidden in homes, mosques, schools, or hospitals, then," the report's writers assert, "its 
attacks cannot be branded as 'indiscriminate' or as 'targeting civilians.'” They explain 
that “Under the laws of war, military objectives may be attacked, even if civilians are 
present, so long as such attacks are in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality” (UN Watch NGO Monitor 2014, p. 101). 
Thus, the mobilization of the normative category of human shields in the 
context of a war should be understood as an attempt to rationalize violence. Accusing 
the enemy of using civilians as human shields changes the status of these civilians, 
transforming them into quasi-combatants that can be killed according to the law; but it 
also changes the broader moral economy of war, since accusing the enemy of human 
shielding is a way of charging it of immoral warfare. The accusation of using human 
shields denounces not only those actors who deploy the shields, but, potentially, the 
entire enemy population. 
Accordingly, the human shield does indeed offer protection, but only to those 
killing civilians and destroying civilian spaces. This is precisely the kind of liberal 
rationalization that Laleh Khalili examines in Times in the Shadows (2012). Khalili's 
analysis of liberal warfare and the desire to always frame its deployment of violence 
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as legal and therefore ethical helps explain why the discourse of human shields is 
prominent within the Israeli context, but nearly absent in relation to political regimes 
that are considered to be illiberal.   
 
Conclusion: The Antinomy of Human Shields 
The politics of human shielding lays bare a fundamental political antinomy informing 
liberal wars. Similar to Agamben’s homo sacer, a human shield is a person who can 
be killed without it being a crime.  However, unlike homo sacer, a human shield is 
neither outside the law nor excluded from political society. Indeed, the condition of 
possibility of becoming a human shield is that one is not a homo sacer, but instead the 
person is recognized as a civilian situated within the law and a bearer of rights. In this 
sense, we disagree with those who have characterized the population in Gaza as 
simply homines sacri. 
         While we have shown that international law permits killing human shields, we 
have also explained how in order to become a shield the inhabitants of Gaza have to 
be considered vulnerable beings presupposed as civilians—a legal category that was 
denied to other colonized populations in the past. Their constitution as vulnerable 
civilians exploited by Hamas—the uncivilized enemy that does not recognize the 
value of civilian life—as tools of military protection allows the Israeli military to 
classify them as human shields, while this classification enables the military to kill 
them and transform the buildings they occupy into rubble in accordance with 
international law. Hence, Gregory’s description of the situation in Palestine as "the 
death of the civilian" appears to be overly hasty, since being a civilian serves as the 
condition of possibility for the production of the human shield category and as such is 
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an essential component in the legitimization and rationalization process that renders 
the population of the Gaza Strip killable.  
This is where the first antinomy emerges. The laws of war intimate that the 
residents of Gaza should be protected as civilians (not homines sacri), but 
concomitantly allow Israel to kill them without violating the law (like the homines 
sacri). This antinomy originates from a fundamental ambivalence constituting the 
politics of human shielding: human shields are in fact framed as civilians who, in 
specific circumstances of war, acquire a particular function (namely, shielding) and 
this function produces their liminal status in such a way that they come to occupy a 
legal threshold. They are civilians, but they are no longer simply civilians since 
willingly or unwilling a new function has been added to their definition as civilians. 
For this function to actually work they have to continue to be considered civilians (if 
they were transformed into combatants or inanimate objects there would not be a 
quandary), but they are now—however passively—considered an integral part of the 
hostilities, which transforms them into killable subjects.  
A second antinomy is intricately tied to the first one. Human shielding seems 
initially to denote a practice of military protection, whereby the human body is 
conceived as a form of defense against potential attacks. And yet, as we have shown, 
the constitution of a civilian as a human shield renders him or her killable and his or 
her space of life destroyable, revealing, as it were, that the technology of protection is 
in reality a necro-technology that allows the deployment of lethal force against the 
vulnerable life of the shield.  
In Frames of War, Judith Butler argues that the norms through which we 
recognize and frame vulnerability can either presuppose or refuse human vulnerability 
itself (Butler 2009 p. 13). In the politics of human shielding civilian vulnerability is 
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presupposed in order to be refused. The constitution of a space in which human 
shields are legitimately killable is premised upon the framing of their life as 
vulnerable life. Human shields are presupposed as precarious civilian lives that 
according to international norms occupy a wrong position in the battlefield and are 
thereby killable. 
29 
 
Bibliography 
Adalah. 2014. Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel and 
others vs. GOC Central Command and others, HCJ 3799/02.  
Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 
———. 2014. L'Uso Dei Corpi (the use of the Bodies). Vicenza, Italy: Neri Pozza. 
Anderson, Charles. 2013. "From Petition to Confrontation: The Palestinian National 
Movement and the Rise of Mass Politics, 1929-1939." Phd, New York 
University. 
Anghie, Antony. 2007. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Bargu, Banu. 2013. "Human Shields." Contemporary Political Theory 12 (4): 277-
295. 
Benjamin, Walter. 1978. "Critique of Violence." In Reflections, edited by Walter 
Benjamin, 277-300. New York: Schoken Books. 
Bhungalia, Lisa. 2010. "A Liminal Territory: Gaza, Executive Discretion, and 
Sanctions Turned Humanitarian." GeoJournal 75 (4): 347-357. 
 
Blatman, Daniel. 2011. The Death Marches: The Final Phase of Nazi Genocide. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Butler, Judith. 2009. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?. London: Verso. 
Cotterell, Paul. 1986. The Railways of Palestine and Israel. Abingdon, UK: Tourret. 
Dinstein, Yoram. 2004. The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International 
Armed Conflict. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Durkheim, Emile. 1915. Germany Above all: German Mentality and War. Paris: 
Librairie Armand Colin. 
Eck, Kristine and Lisa Hultman. 2007. "One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War 
Insights from New Fatality Data." Journal of Peace Research 44 (2): 233-246. 
Erlich, Reuven. 2006. Hezbollah's use of Lebanese Civilians as Human Shields: The 
Extensive Military Infrastructure Positioned and Hidden in Populated Areas. 
from within the Lebanese Towns and Villages Deliberate Rocket Attacks were 
Directed Against Civilian Targets in Israel. Tel-Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism 
Information Center at the Center for Special Studies. 
30 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977. New York: Pantheon. 
Frederick, Bob. "Netanyahu Reveals Photo of Children Playing Near Hamas Rocket 
Launcher." New York Post, accessed 01/04, 2015, 
http://nypost.com/2014/09/30/netanyahu-reveals-photo-of-children-playing-near-
hamas-rocket-launcher/. 
Graham, Stephen. 2011. Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism. London, 
UK: Verso Books. 
Gregory, Derek. 2006a. "" In another Time-Zone, the Bombs Fall Unsafely....": 
Targets, Civilians, and Late Modern War." The Arab World Geographer 9 (2): 
88-111. 
———. 2006b. "The Death of the Civilian." Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space 24 (5): 633-638. 
———. 2011. "The Everywhere War." The Geographical Journal 177 (3): 238-250. 
Hannikainen, Lauri. 1988. Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: 
Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status. Philadelphia: Coronet Books 
Inc. 
Hull, Isabel V. 2014. A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law 
during the Great War. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. 
ITIC. 2009a. Evidence of the use of the Civilian Population as Human Shields. Tel-
Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 
———.2009b. Using Civilians as Human Shields. Tel-Aviv: Intelligence and 
Terrorism Information Center. 
Kasher, Asa. 2014. "The Ethics of Protective Edge." The Jewish Review of Books, 
Fall. 
Khalili, Laleh. 2012. Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies. Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Kinsella, Helen. 2011. The Image before the Weapon: A Critical History of the 
Distinction between Combatant and Civilian. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
Meron, Theodor. 1989. Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
NGO Monitor and UN Watch. 2014. Filling in the Blanks: Documenting Missing 
Dimensions in UN and NGO “Investigations” of the Gaza Conflict online at 
http://www.ngo-monitor.org/2014_Gaza_Conflict.pdf. 
31 
 
OCHA oPt. 2014. Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency, Situation 
Report. Jerusalem: OCHA oPt. 
Official Commission of the Belgian Government. 1915. Reports on the Violation of 
the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium. London: 
Harrison and Sons. 
Orford, Anne. 2003. Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the use 
of Force in International Law. Vol. 30. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Otto, Roland. 2004. "Neighbours as Human Shields? the Israel Defense Forces'“Early 
Warning Procedure” and International Humanitarian Law." Revue Internationale 
De La Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross 86 (856): 771-787. 
Perugini, Nicola and Neve Gordon. 2015. The Human Right to Dominate, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Pictet, Jean. 1958. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva: 
International Committee of the Red Cross. 
Pilloud, Claude, Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann. 1987. 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols: Of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949. Dirdrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Ringmar, Erik. 2013. "“How to Fight Savage Tribes”: The Global War on Terror in 
Historical Perspective." Terrorism and Political Violence 25 (2): 264-283. 
Rogers, APV and P. Malherbe. 1999. Fight it Right: Model Manual on the Law of 
Armed Conflict for Armed Forces. Geneva: ICRC. 
Rubinstein, Amnon and Yaniv Roznai. 2011. "Human Shields in Modern Armed 
Conflicts: The Need for a Proportionate Proportionality." Stanford Law & Policy 
Review 22 (1): 93-128. 
Said, Edward W. 1980. The Question of Palestine. New York, NY: Vintage Books. 
Sassòli, Marco, Antoine A. Bouvier, and Anne Quintin. 2011. "How does Law Protect 
in War?" Geneva: ICRC. 
Schmitt, Michael. 2008. "Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law." Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights 38: 17-59. 
Sissons, Miranda. 2002. In a Dark Hour: The use of Civilians during IDF Arrest 
Operations. New York: Human Rights Watch. 
Stein, Yael. 2002. Human Shield: Use of Palestinian Civilians as Human Shields in 
Violation of High Court of Justice Order. Jerusalem: B'tselem. 
32 
 
Virilio, Paul. 1989. War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception. London: Verso. 
Walzer, Michael. 2013. "Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare." Dissentmagazine.Org. 
Weizman, Eyal. 2006. "Lethal Theory." Roundtable: Research Architecture. 
Wilke, Christiane. "Civilians, Combatants, and Histories of International Law." 
Critical Legal Thinking, accessed 01/07, 2015, 
http://criticallegalthinking.com/2014/07/28/civilians-combatants-histories-
international-law/. 
 
 
